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Practical Intentionality. 
From Brentano to the Phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles 
Alessandro Salice 




Intentionality – understood as a specific property which, if instantiated, makes minds 
of or about objects and facts – is a topic that is almost inextricable from 
phenomenology itself. However, this specific understanding of “intentionality” 
captures just one meaning of that abstract term. Given that “intentionality” is the 
nominalization of the predicate “intentional,” there is a second and much more 
common usage of this predicate within ordinary English – one that first and foremost 
relates to actions: “A schoolteacher may ask a child who has spilled the ink in class: 
‘Did you do that intentionally?’” (Austin 1970: 274, my emphasis). Now, what 
property is intentionality in this second sense? As a first approximation, it can be said 
that an action is intentional if it is prompted and steered by a conative state. For 
instance, to spill ink intentionally somehow requires the agent to have a state of a kind 
similar to that of desires, volitions, wishes, intentions, etc. Put another way, it is at 
least partly because the agent has the desire or will or intention to spill ink that her 
action qualifies as intentional – in the more ordinary sense of this predicate.  
 
One interesting aspect of such conative states is that, however they are to be 
described, they too seem to be of something or directed towards something – a state 
of affairs or fact or event that the agent intends to bring about. Accordingly, one can 
ascertain a certain overlap between the two meanings of “intentionality” – for an 
action to be intentional in the second sense, the subject must have an adequate 
conative state that, being about a goal, is intentional in the first sense. This makes the 
conditions for an action to be intentional different from – and yet not unrelated to – 
the conditions for a mental state to be of something. 
 
This practical dimension of intentionality has not escaped the attention of 
phenomenologists either. Quite the contrary. One segment within the history of this 
philosophical movement, which is especially relevant for the topic at issue, stretches 
from the end of the nineteenth to the first decades of the twentieth century. During 
this period of time, one can observe a fairly definite line of research that originates 
with Brentano’s considerations about the specific topic of intentional action and is 
developed further by the phenomenological circles of Munich and Göttingen (on the 
phenomenology of these two circles, cf. Salice 2015a). In the turn of not even five 
years (from around 1910 to ca. 1915), early phenomenologists have all made the 
notion of intentional action the target of a proper battery of investigations. Here, I am 
mainly referring to the relevant publications of Alexander Pfänder (1900, 1911), 
Adolf Reinach (1912/13), Max Scheler (1913/16) and Dietrich von Hildebrand (1916 
– this is the revised text of Hildebrand’s dissertation submitted in 1912). 1  These 
contributions take all their first steps exactly from the intuition that there are 
intentional experiences of a conative kind, which trigger and accompany our actions, 
but they diverge on how exactly to account for these experiences and for their relation 
to action. In a recent paper, Uriah Kriegel associates the French philosophy of the 40s 
with “the golden decade of conative phenomenology” (cf. Kriegel 2013: 538) – but 
the considerations put forward in this article suggest that conation became the subject 
of a lively research interest already within early phenomenology. 
 
This paper claims that phenomenological contributions to the theory of action are 
highly relevant for at least two orders of reasons. The first is mainly historical: they 
indicate that phenomenological reflection on intentionality has, from its very 
beginning, taken into account and accommodated both senses of the term 
“intentionality.”2 The second reason is grounded in systematic considerations: these 
contributions are second to none when it comes to the wealth of insights they secure. 
In particular, they uncover that intentions are mental states of a sui generis kind, to be 
distinguished from desires, wishes, willing, and other kinds of conative states, and 
that intentions play an indispensable role for planning, deliberation and, ultimately, 
action. Early phenomenological theory about practical intentionality hence bears 
                                                        
1 In this narrative, a fundamental role is played by Edmund Husserl. First, in Vienna, Husserl 
attends Brentano’s courses on ethics in 1884/85 and 1886 (cf. Schuhmann, 1977: 13, 15) 
where Brentano develops important ideas about his theory of action (cf. Brentano 1954). 
Second, Husserl’s Logical Investigations of 1900-01 exert a forceful influence on the work of 
early phenomenologists (cf. Salice 2012). Third, Husserl’s lectures on Ethics and the Theory 
of Values given in Göttingen 1908/09, 1911 and 1914 present ideas about volition and action 
that are developed in the same period of time and stand in close relation to those discussed in 
this paper (cf. Husserl 1988). This notwithstanding, this article is not in a position to address 
Husserl’s view in any detail (on Husserl’s treatment of action in the first two decades of 1900, 
cf. Melle 1997, Mertens 1998, Rinofner-Kreidl 2014, Uemura 2015). Other important 
contributions to the topic at stake, which again will remain neglected in this paper, are 
provided by Theodor Lipps (cf. 1902, 1909) – the teacher of many early phenomenologists in 
Munich and an equally profound source of inspiration.  
2 This clearly counteracts a widely received view in the literature according to which the first 
extensive account of actions or activities has to be credited to Martin Heidegger (cf. Dreyfus 
1991). Moreover, it should not be neglected that early-phenomenological investigations go 
much further than merely taking conation into consideration. They are not limited to pure 
descriptions of practical intentionality, but enter the normative dimension by crucially 
touching upon the ethical and legal bearing of intentional actions. (Although important and 
interesting, an exploration of ethical and legal aspects of actions would exceed the purposes 
of this chapter.) 
 
striking similarities to the theory of intentions later developed by Searle (1983) and 
Bratman (1987), as will be shown. 
 
Against this background, the present article is an attempt to mine, present and 
evaluate main aspects of the development of phenomenological theory about practical 
intentions. To reach this goal, the paper is organized into three parts. In the first 
Section, the notion of intention as a conative state of a genuine kind is briefly 
introduced by illustrating the shift that occurred within contemporary theory of action 
from the belief-desire (BD) to the belief-desire-intention (BDI) model of practical 
intentionality. The second Section illustrates Brentano’s view about action and 
presents it as a variant of the BD-account. Finally, Section 3 reconstructs the 
substantial revision that Brentano’s ideas underwent in early phenomenology. It is 
argued that early phenomenology already accomplished a turn from a BD to a BDI 
account of intentionality agency and that it operates with a notion of an intention that, 
in many respects, is more fertile than the one at the core of current debate. 
 
1. The Belief-Desire-Intention Model of Practical Intentionality. 
 
What makes an action intentional? The answer that used to dominate the 
philosophical debate on action is that an action is intentional if it enters into an 
adequate relation with the beliefs and the desires of the agent. For instance, assuming 
that I am thirsty, if I wish not to be thirsty and if I believe that having a drink will 
extinguish my thirst, then the action of drinking can be considered as intentional. 
Philosophers diverge on how to cash out the notion of an “appropriate relation,” and 
especially on whether this is a motivational (cf. Anscombe (2000)) or a causal (cf. 
Davidson (2002a) and Goldman (1970)) relation, but the agreement upon the 
explanatory function of beliefs and desires for the notion of intentional action licenses 
the umbrella term “belief-desire [BD] model” to qualify this account.  
 
In the last decades, the BD-model of intentional action has encountered growing 
resistance. And this is mainly because its explanatory power seems to fall too short 
(cf. Bratman 1987). On the BD understanding, “intentionality” is first and foremost a 
property that applies to actions in the sense that an action qualifies as intentional if it 
is done with an intention. And it is done with an intention, if the agent has the relevant 
beliefs and desires. But this means: the BD model does not leave space for intentions 
as specific conative states of the mind. Put another way, according to this approach, 
intentions are nothing else than suitably aggregated complexes of beliefs and desires 
(cf. Davidson 2002b). 
 
Yet, it seems that there are good reasons for hosting genuine practical intentions in 
our mental repertoire. In particular, prior or future-directed intentions (what are also 
called “decisions”) are recalcitrant to being accommodated within the BD framework. 
To see why, consider the following example. Imagine that you decide at time t to 
make Sauce Mayonnaise at a later time t’. How should this fact, i.e., your decision, be 
described? It is certainly something related to your future action, but it is also, and 
crucially, formed before the action’s onset – to be sure, there are circumstances in 
which actions immediately follow decisions, but this does not necessarily have to be 
the case. Consequently, it seems plausible to characterize (practical) intentionality as 
something that, when it comes to future-directed intentions especially, qualifies the 
mind primarily and actions secondarily. Against this background, however, one could 
argue that to form a decision is nothing else than to have a desire with peaking 
intensity. Indeed, it appears that desires or wishes occur with different degrees of 
intensity. Still, there are other considerations that may be able to block this 
interpretation. 
 
Firstly, desires are volatile – they wax and wane over time depending on the contexts, 
emotions, moods of the agent, etc. Intentions, by contrast, enhance stability in one’s 
conduct. They do so because they generate commitments (cf. Bratman 1987: 15ff). If 
you have decided to make Sauce Mayonnaise at t’, you will then tend to discard 
alternative options – that is, you will tend not to revise your intention: e.g., the option 
of making a Sauce of some other kind becomes less attractive. To be sure, the 
commitments at stake here are intrapersonal; they are mere “creatures of the will,” as 
Margaret Gilbert puts it (2006: 6), meaning that they can be reneged by the agent 
herself alone and, thus, have a limited binding force. This force is limited especially if 
it is compared with that of interpersonal commitments, such as those brought about by 
promises or other speech acts, which can be rescinded only in accordance with their 
addressees (as Reinach already highlights, cf. his 2012). And, yet, intrapersonal 
commitments are commitments and, consequently, they commit the agent to the 
conduct she has decided upon, making it costly to retract the original intention.  
 
Secondly, if one makes a decision, one puts oneself under the demand of forming at 
least a rough plan of how to reach the goal set by the intention (Bratman 2014: 15ff). 
Intentions, in other words, are plan states for they involve planning and the design of 
a (however vague) project or plan or strategy towards the goal. That is, intentions 
create a pressure to settle on means and to respect the norms of instrumental 
rationality. If you have decided to make Sauce Mayonnaise, you are already in the 
thick of it: you have an idea of how to make it (or of where to look for the recipe), and 
you structure your further actions in light of that intention. By contrast, one can 
entertain desires without any pressure to settle on the means that should lead the agent 
to fulfill the contents of that desire. That opens the possibility for a subject to have 
contrasting, i.e., mutually incompatible, desires, but impedes her from having 
contrasting intentions, at pain of irrationality. In other words, you can have the two 
desires to make Sauce Mayonnaise and to make Sauce Béarnaise – but you can decide 
in favor of only one of the two lines of actions. 
 
Thirdly, intentions are causally self-referential states (cf. Searle 1983: 86ff). To 
understand what is meant by causal self-referentiality, suppose you intend to φ (for 
instance, you intend to become rich). Given that intentions are intentional states, they 
have intentional contents – the intentional content being the element of a mental state 
that identifies its conditions of satisfaction. Intentions are self-reflexive attitudes 
because their content prescribes that the state of affairs φ has to be caused by the very 
intention to φ. Hence, in order to satisfy your intention of becoming rich, becoming 
rich is something that has to be brought about by your very intention. Desires, by 
contrast, do not need to be causally self-referential. If you have the desire of 
becoming rich, your desire would be satisfied even if you become rich because, e.g., 
you inherit a fortune from an unknown relative.  
 
Considered altogether, these thoughts recommend a revision of the BD-model, one 
that takes seriously the role of intentions as conative states of a genuine kind in our 
thought and agency (the ‘BDI’-account). One particularly interesting remark with 
respect to this argumentative move is made by Bratman in his Intention, Plans, and 
Practical Reason (1987). Though only in passing, Bratman claims there that the BDI-
account he so convincingly advanced is supposed to be developed in accordance with 
commonsense psychology (Bratman 1987: 9). One way to read this remark is that 
everyday mentalistic talk is imbued with references to intentions and that the BDI-
account is in a position to refine our commonsensical notion of an intention. 
 
This may be correct, but it is far from clear why the BDI model has to seek 
congruence with commonsense psychology – for it is not the task of folk psychology 
to produce accurate descriptions of our mental states. Yet, and arguably, this is 
exactly (one of) phenomenology’s task(s). And, if so, then perhaps advocators of the 
BDI-account may be better advised to start with accurate descriptions of our mental 
states, rather than with laymen’s opinions – and that just means starting with 
phenomenology, rather than with folk psychology (cf. Gallagher/Zahavi 2012: 10). 
But then, the question arises as to whether phenomenologists do have a salient notion 
of intention. The next two Sections formulate an answer to this question.  
 
2. Brentano on Willing. 
 
The place Brentano reserves for action and volition in his work is rather limited, 
especially if this is compared with his treatment of other topics within his descriptive 
psychology. Yet, if one reads the relevant passages against the background of the 
general framework of his psychology, they can be easily contextualized and can allow 
for a number of conclusions that enable the emergence of a coherent view about his 
theory of action. Hence, it is fruitful to begin by outlining some core ideas of his 
general framework before entering into the details of conation. 
 
In his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1995a), Brentano claims that mental 
states (“psychische Phänomene”) fall into three, and only three, kinds: mental states 
are presentations, judgments or what he calls “Gemütsbewegungen” – generally 
translated as “emotional states,” or, perhaps better, “affective” states. These three 
kinds of mental states (“phenomena” or “acts” in Brentano’s terminology) are in a 
hierarchical order. Presentations are the most basic states in the sense that they are 
always presupposed by judgments and affects. Accordingly, Brentano also qualifies 
the latter acts as “superposed acts” (Brentano 1995b: 90). To present an example, if a 
subject judges that this particular rose is red, then the judgmental act can be said to be 
“superposed” on a presentation of the red rose, in the sense that the former act could 
not exist without the latter. Similarly, if a subject hates something or someone, then a 
presentation of that thing or person underlies the emotion of hatred. 
 
Superposition, according to Brentano, entails identity of the intentional object: if an 
act is superposed on another act, both acts have the same object. This means that the 
difference between superposed acts and presentations cannot be accounted for in 
terms of a difference in their objects. What rather distinguishes these mental 
phenomena is the very kind of intentional relation in which their subject is involved: 
more specifically, all superposed acts come either in a positive or in a negative form. 
For instance, in affects, one is directed towards an object with inclination or 
disinclination (love or hate, pleasure or displeasure). Similarly, judgments are 
characterized by the fact that the subject, when judging, adopts either a positive or a 
negative stance (either belief or disbelief) towards the object. By contrast, no 
corresponding opposition is observable in presentations (Brentano 2009: 17).  
 
As said, judgments and affects belong to different classes of mental states. Brentano 
develops several arguments for distinguishing these two classes of mental acts, but 
one is crucial for the purposes of this paper (but cf. Brentano 1995a: 225 for other 
interesting arguments): Brentano argues that, given the presentation of an object, there 
is only one correct judgment that a subject can make about that object. This is a 
positive judgment if the presentation targets the object (expressible by a sentence of 
the form “the object x exists”) and a negative one if the presentation is empty or 
misfires (expressible by a sentence of the form “the object x does not exist”). Put 
differently, judgments come either in a positive or in a negative quality and, given the 
presentation of an object x, only one of these two judgmental stances can be correctly 
adopted by the subject towards object x. Things are different in the case of affects: 
given the presentation of an object x, Brentano claims, the subject can adopt different 
affects, which can both be credited as correct with respect to that object x. For 
instance, suppose that you love a given object x and that, at some point, an object y 
presents itself to you as more valuable than object x. In this situation it seems 
legitimate to say that you correctly love x, but that you also correctly love x less than 
you love y.  
 
However, this is not a faithful description of this mental scenario, Brentano contends, 
for “[it] would imply that for each instance of rejoicing only a certain amount of joy is 
appropriate.” (Brentano 2009: 15) But loving x less than y does not necessitate that 
the subject is prevented from loving x with the greatest love possible. To put this 
differently, one can fully enjoy x and yet prefer y to x. Hence, a more accurate 
description is that loving x less than loving y just means preferring object y to object x 
(cf. Brentano, 1954: 147). The mental state of “preference [vorziehen, bevorzugen]” is 
portrayed by Brentano as a sui generis affect that puts two (or more) objects into a 
relation: accordingly, when a subject prefers something to something else, she is 
directed not to one, but to two (or more) objects. Furthermore, since y is more 
valuable than x, the preference of y over x is correct (on the axiological relations that 
correlate to correct preferences, cf. Chisholm 1977). This leads to the idea that 
judgments and affects belong to two distinct kinds of mental states. They are different 
because a subject can adopt two different yet both correct affects towards one and the 
same object – but it is impossible for her to adopt two correct judgments, but with 
different qualities, towards one and the same object. In other words, one can love (or 
hate) things or persons more or less than others (depending on one’s preferences), but 
one cannot judge things “more or less” than others.  
 
Brentano’s framework accommodates conations in his third class of mental states. 
One of the reasons for this classification is that the same observations made above 
with respect to the emotions of love and hate can also be made about desires 
(Wünsche, Begehrungen).3 Most importantly, what conative experiences share with 
emotions is the fact that desires, just like emotions, can enter into a relation with an 
act of preference (1995a: 225). But how is the act of preference to be described within 
the conative dimension? 
 
Suppose a hungry and thirsty donkey is located at an equal distance from a stack of 
hay and a pail of water. The donkey has two contrasting and opposite desires, but it is 
only if the donkey has a greater desire to, say, eat rather than to drink, that it won’t 
starve. This scenario, according to Brentano, is analogous to the one described above 
with respect to emotions. It is analogous because, to survive, the donkey has to realize 
a specific act of preference to the effect that, ultimately, one of the two things is 
preferred to the other. When a preference occurs between contrasting desires, the 
subject has made what in ordinary language is called a “choice.” However, since the 
concept of preference is not confined to conation, as we saw above, “preference” can 
be considered to be the more general concept, while “choosing [wählen]” is the more 
specific. There are two conditions that, if fulfilled, turn a preference into a choice. 
 
The first is that choosing has to entail an act of “deciding [Entscheiden].” Decision, 
again, is not an act that is confined to the sphere of action. To illustrate this, Brentano 
shows that affects in general can enter into an exclusive or non-exclusive relation. For 
instance, one can have two affects of love, both of which are compatible with each 
other (non-exclusive), e.g., the love of mathematics and the love of poetry (cf. 
                                                        
3 Another reason put forward is Brentano’s “transition argument” – to use an expression 
employed by Michelle Montague (cf. Montague 2017); this argument relies upon a certain 
phenomenological continuity in the quality of affects which, according to Brentano, makes it 
impossible to neatly distinguish volitions from emotions (cf. Brentano 1995a: 184, but cf. 
Anscombe 1978 for a critical response to the transition argument).  
Brentano 1954: 219). But, in certain cases, affects are in an exclusive relation to each 
other – e.g., the desire that the sun will be shining tomorrow is not compatible with 
the desire that it rains tomorrow. In the latter cases, the subject may be forced to 
decide. Now, not all decisions are volitions (the decision in favor of the desire that the 
sun will shine tomorrow is not a volition), and yet all volitions are decisions – to use 
Brentano’s wording: “all willing is deciding” (cf. Brentano 1954: 219, my trans.). 
 
But then, what characterizes volition or the phenomenon of willing in 
contradistinction to desires? What, in other words, is the second condition that 
transforms a preference into a choice? This has to do with certain beliefs of the 
subject: a decision is a volition if and only if the subject believes that the content of 
her desire can be realized through her actions. Once this element is in play, Brentano 
concludes: 
 
We can thus define the will as a decisional desire [entscheidendes Wünschen], 
which has as its object something, which can be brought about by ourselves and 
which is expected with conviction to be an effect of our desire. In other words, this 
is a desire, in whose favor we have decided and in whose realisability through our 
actions we believe (cf. Brentano 1954: 219, my trans., cf. also 1995a: 193, 2009: 
102).  
 
On the basis of this definition, it is just a small step to infer that “the willing is not a 
primitive [elementares] phenomenon” (cf. 1954: 219) – it is not, because it can be 
traced back to a desire standing in an appropriate relation to certain beliefs of the 
subject. More precisely, willing is always choosing in the sense that it is a decision 
between two or more desires and that this decision is based upon beliefs about the 
realizability of the desire’s content. This reconstruction4 credits the view that suitable 
aggregations of beliefs and desires are the horse that pulls the cart in Brentano’s 
explanation of practical intentionality. 5 To put this differently, Brentano seems to 
embrace a BD model of intentional agency. 
                                                        
4 However, these are certainly not the only beliefs that seem to accompany willing – for 
instance, the donkey should also have a belief about the fact that eating decreases hunger. 
This might lead to an objection against the above reconstruction: given that, for Brentano, all 
mental states are conscious, if action has to be traced back to desires and beliefs, all the 
agent’s beliefs involved in agency should be conscious. But this is highly implausible. To 
resist this objection, one could recur to Brentano’s notion of “habitual dispositions”: these are 
physiological entities, which – although existent – are not mental phenomena, because they 
are not conscious (cf. 1995a: 45). If this is correct, then an intentional action is one that is 
linked not to a belief-desire pair sic et simpliciter, but also to habitual dispositions. (This 
suggestion goes back to an exchange I had with Uriah Kriegel about these issues. I am 
thankful to Uriah for his essential contribution, though I am solely responsible for every 
possible mistake made here.) 
5 It should not go unmentioned that there is another way of reading Brentano on volition – one 
which does not emphasize the link between desire and the belief about the desire’s 
 
3. Early Phenomenologists on Motivation and Deliberation.  
 
Brentano’s considerations on volition initiate a series of investigations that directly 
connect to early phenomenology. One way to read early phenomenologists is by 
emphasizing an important distinction that remains underdetermined in Brentano’ 
account – this is the distinction between motivation and deliberation. Whereas, for 
Brentano, intentional actions can be traced back to the will and the will to a suitable 
combination of desires and beliefs, early phenomenologists hold, first, that the will 
belongs to a specific kind of experience and, second, that the will itself has to be 
discerned from intentions. Within the phenomenon of agency, volitions are confined 
to the dimension of motivation, whereas intentions identify the dimension of 
deliberation. 
 
This conceptual distinction is argued for in at least four conceptual steps. First, early 
phenomenologists contrast the attempt to characterize willing by starting with desire – 
they vindicate the phenomenological credentials of willing, and some of them attempt 
to define desire in terms of willing. Second, they locate willing at the level of 
motivation, which may or may not lead the subject to form a decision or an intention. 
Third, they accommodate intentions as acts of a primitive kind, disclosing the whole 
dimension of deliberation. And fourth, they define intentional action or action tout 
court (Handlung) in terms of an activity that is performed upon an intention.  
 
In this Section, these argumentative steps are reconstructed and put in relation to 
those authors that have developed them most extensively. Steps one and two comprise 
the focus of the first subsection, while steps three and four comprise that of the 
second subsection. At this juncture it is important to note that it is not the aim of this 
paper to argue that early phenomenologists articulated a unitary theory of intentional 
agency. But instead of focusing on the divergences between their ideas, the leading 
thread of this chapter is that their insights are largely compatible with one another’s 
and that, if suitably combined, they license an account of intentions and actions that 




As seen in the previous Section, Brentano claims that desires turn into volitions if 
(among other conditions) they are accompanied by certain beliefs regarding the 
                                                                                                                                                              
realisability through the subject’s actions. In fact, in some passages, Brentano equates willing 
with decision tout court rather than with choice, cf. “It should be noted that I can thus want or 
desire a thing without at all believing it to be something I can bring about myself. I can want 
or desire that the weather be good tomorrow, but I have no choice in the matter” Brentano 
2009: 102, cf. also 2009: 77). This second, and more general, sense of ‘willing’ is at the core 
of Kriegel’s reconstruction of Brentano’s conative phenomenology, cf. Kriegel 2017, ch. 7. 
possibility of realizing the contents of those very desires. Exactly the opposite view is 
adopted by Scheler. According to him, willing is the most fundamental conative 
experience such that it is the notion of desire that has to be defined through willing 
and not the other way around (cf. Scheler 1973: 124). Many of Scheler’s insights 
about intentional agency will be developed further by other phenomenologists, but the 
core idea seems to be that willing is, first and foremost, a striving (Streben), the 
content of which is given to the subject as something to be realized (“als ein zu 
realisierender,” 1973: 123 – the normative meaning conveyed by this formulation 
will be addressed in 3.2). Under this characterization, one could say that a child may 
genuinely want “that a star fall into his lap” (cf. Scheler 1973: 123). And this also 
explains why many human beings to this day can still think that the will can make it 
rain or make the sun shine or even why “an educated person feels something like 
‘guilt’ if something which he had ‘willed’ to happen occurs accidentally, e.g. the 
death of a person” (Scheler 1973: 124).  
 
Especially the two former cases show that individuals literally need to learn that, for 
any content of the will to be realized, the will has to be complemented by a further 
attitude, which Scheler labels “will-to-do [Tunwollen]”. A will-to-do is a specific 
form of will in the sense that its contents are more specific – for the will-to-do is, 
indeed, the will to do something (whilst “will” tout court, as highlighted above, is not 
subject to that restriction). The difference in content between these experiences is 
tackled in 3.2, but a word is first needed on how Scheler’s considerations hack back to 
the notion of desire. According to Scheler, the will-to-do closely correlates with a 
third experience – the experience of being-able-to-do (Tunkönnen); the two are 
closely tied because the will-to-do has to be accredited, as it were, by an experience of 
being-able-to-do. Without the first experience, the second cannot occur for it is only if 
one has a sense of being able to do something that one can want to do that.  
 
Once these two mental states (the will-to-do and the being-able-to-do) are in place, in 
the sense that the subject at some point in her mental life has experienced them, 
desires can make their appearance on the mental scene. More precisely, a volition 
acquires a desire character (Wunschcharakter) for a subject, when she forms a will 
that lies beyond the sphere of the being-able-to-do. The notion of desire, in other 
words, does not pick out a genuine kind of mental state, but is just an experiential 
coloring that the will assumes once it becomes transparent to the subject that that state 
cannot be accompanied by a will-to-do (and this because it is not possible for the 
subject to be in a state of being-able-to-do about the content of that volition).6 If 
considered from this perspective, even the desire “that something should happen 
                                                        
6 It seems plausible to argue that Scheler’s “desire character” is a phenomenal nuance that 
accompanies the volition and not a qualification that the subject assigns to her volition on the 
basis of inferences grounded in beliefs about what one can and cannot do. In fact, being-able-
to-do is described by Scheler as an experience (Erlebnis) rather than as a belief or knowledge 
about one’s agentive possibilities (cf. 1973: 129). 
‘through’ me remains a ‘desire’ and does not become a ‘will’” (Scheler 1973: 124, 
trans. mod., on this difference cf. also Mulligan 2012: 65). Similarly, “willing is not 
wishing; even a willing that, in certain circumstances, is futile, devious, impossible, is 
not a wishing for this very reason” (Löwenstein 1933: 167, my trans.7). 
 
Forming a volition is not an event that occurs out of the blue in one’s mind, as it were 
– this experience enters into important relations with other experiences. To see this, it 
might be important to first look into some of the general traits of the will, which 
especially Hildebrand’s investigations contribute to laying bare. Hildebrand describes 
the will as a stance or position-taking (Stellungnahme) of the conative kind (cf. also 
Reiner 1927: 74).8 There are two ideas that one can find packed in the single claim of 
willing being a stance. The first is that the will is the subject’s response to a correlate 
and the second is that it requires a founding experience. 
 
The will is a response in roughly the same sense in which emotional stances, like 
love, enthusiasm, blame, hate, disgust, etc., can be described as responses: in all these 
states, the subject does not passively represent an object or a state of affairs, but she 
rather adopts a given stance towards it. More precisely, she responds to what 
nowadays is called the correlate’s “formal object” (cf. Kenny 2003: 134) – in 
Hildebrand’s terminology: she responds to the mind-independent “values” of the 
correlate or to the mind-dependent preferences that she associates with that correlate.9 
Put differently, volitive and emotional stances enter into relations with formal objects: 
if one appreciates a work of art, one appreciates it because of, say, its beauty; and if 
one wants something, one is responding to the goodness of the correlate or to its 
importance for the subject. 
 
On the one hand, the formal object specifies the criteria of adequacy for the stance vis 
à vis its correlate – the stance is adequate if it is elicited towards suitable values or 
preferences. On the other hand, however, the formal object is not in a position to 
                                                        
7 While insisting on the unbridgeable difference between wishing and willing, Löwenstein 
argues in favor of the idea that wishing is a primitive kind of mental state with its own 
distinctive phenomenology, cf. Löwenstein 1933: 177ff. 
8  Interestingly, while Brentano distinguishes between beliefs and affects, early 
phenomenologists tend to conceive of them as belonging to the same kind of mental state 
(beliefs, emotions and volitions are stances). This is mainly due to the fact that, unlike 
Brentano, they distinguish belief (or conviction) from assertion (Behauptung) within the 
notion of judgment. As illustrated in 3.2, just like intentions, assertions are mental acts that, 
indeed, cannot be described as stances, but rather as spontaneous actions of the subject. 
9  In contrast to Scheler’s theory, Hildebrand’s theory of volition radically distinguishes 
between cases in which the will responds to values and cases in which it responds to the 
subject’s preferences (cf. Crosby 2002). Exploring this distinction, which bears importantly 
on ethical issues, would exceed the purposes of this paper. Yet, it should suffice to say that, 
just like values, preferences set adequacy criteria for stances. Put differently, subjects can be 
mistaken about their own preferences, cf. Reinach 1989b: 298. 
exact a response on the side of the subject. To put the last point differently, it is 
possible for the subject to be aware of the correlate’s formal object without eliciting a 
corresponding response. It is possible, e.g., for a subject to be aware of an artwork’s 
value without this awareness’ giving rise to an emotion of admiration. Or it is possible 
for a subject to be aware of the value of a certain action (e.g., to help someone in 
need) without this awareness leading the subject to a will to help (on this, cf. also 
Pfänder 1967: 28).  
 
These considerations suggest that stances do not coincide with the apprehension of 
the correlate’s formal object. And this leads to the second claim that early 
phenomenologists connect to the idea of willing as a stance: whenever a volition 
occurs, this stance is based on or founded by a further act, which is supposed to grasp 
the correlate’s formal object (cf. Mulligan 2010). That is to say, volitional stances are 
in-need-of-being-founded, given that their existence is grounded in the existence of 
other states that provide access to the correlate’s formal object. According to 
Hildebrand, the routes that lead a subject to form a volition are manifold: one can be 
acquainted with values directly by means of an experience of feeling (Fühlen, cf. also 
Scheler 253ff, Reinach 1989b: 295). Or one can cognize that a given action has a 
value, or one can know (in a non-intuitive way) of a given action that it has a certain 
value. All these states (feeling, cognizing a state of affairs, or non-intuitive 
knowledge) can ground volitions (in a morally significant way, cf. Salice 2015b).10 
 
But if the will is not exacted by those underlying states, what is the relation between 
them? Phenomenologists argue that this is a relation of motivation. Willing, in other 
words, relies on motives – not on causes – as Pfänder claims (1967: 33f). More 
precisely, motivation requires the subject to be opened to the facts and objects in the 
world in the sense that, given the worldly circumstances that perceptions, feelings etc. 
present to the subject, she is confronted with the question “what shall I do?” (Pfänder 
1967: 28, Reinach 1989b: 291, 298).  
 
This question triggers a process of reflection on the side of the subject. In this process, 
the subject is attentive to the demands (Forderungen) that the world is raising. If, e.g., 
I enter a room and I feel cold in the room, the perceived chill can invite me to 
consider the question “what shall I do?” Obviously, this question does not need to be 
explicitly stated, but it induces the subject to “listen to [hinhören]” the demands that 
                                                        
10 Note that the acts grasping values can miss their targets. When the act misfires, it presents 
the subject with what could be called a ‘perfect impostor,’ i.e., a phenomenal element that 
merely emulates a value or a preference. If the subject elicits a response in this case, then this 
has to be the correct response with respect to the impostor. In other words, what is at fault 
here is primarily the act that presented the alleged formal object to the stance, while the 
stance itself is only indirectly at fault. Hildebrand formulates this point as follows: 
“concerning the phenomenal value which is given to me, the value-response [Wertantwort], if 
any, can only be the correct one” (Hildebrand 1969: 40, my trans.). 
the situation is raising. In Pfänder’s example, such listening can put the subject in a 
position to “perceive” or, more literally, “hear [vernehmen]” the demand to leave the 
room. However, hearing the demand and acknowledging [anerkennen] its validity 
does not yet mean that one is moved to leave the room (just as perceiving the value of 
helping someone in need does not yet comprise the will to help him or her). It is only 
if the subject wants to leave the room on the ground of (auf Grund) – or by relying on 
(sich stützend auf) – the demand that her decision is motivated by the demand (on the 
motivational process of listening/hearing/relying to, cf. Pfänder 1967: 28f, and also 
Reinach 1989b: 290-303). 
 
3.2. Practical Intentions 
 
At this stage, a further distinction has to be drawn. Volitions, it has been said, are 
motivated by other states, but they can also motivate. They are motivating because 
they motivate actions – via intentions. Just as one and the same volition can be 
triggered by different acts, so can one and the same decision be motivated by different 
volitions. For instance, I can decide to go to the pub because I want to meet a friend, 
or because I want to have a pint, or because I am in a low mood and want to partake 
in the pub’s jolly atmosphere, etc. 
 
But then, what are intentions – in contradistinction to volitions? Terminologically, 
early phenomenologists employ the juridical term Vorsatz, but also the more 
colloquial Entschluss (and sometimes the technical terms Willensakt, 
Willensentschluss, Willensvorsatz, etc.), to name these states.11 Both terms could be 
translated as “resolution” or “decision” and are used in combination with the reflexive 
verbs sich entschließen, sich vornehmen (literally, “to decide,” viz. “to resolve” to do 
something – though the reflexivity of the verbs gets lost in the English translation). 
Conceptually, there are at least five different, and yet not unconnected, aspects that 
seem to univocally qualify intentions: (i) intentions are mental actions of the subject; 
(ii) they are acts of self-determination; (iii) they generate commitments; (iv) their 
contents come with an instrumental structure built in (they are projects); and (v) they 
secure a unique, first-personal, perspective towards the action itself.12 With that, it is 
now time to turn to the level of deliberation. 
 
                                                        
11 Interestingly, the more straightforward German equivalent of “intention,” i.e., Absicht, is 
not used frequently by early phenomenologists. An exception is Scheler, who employs this 
term to refer to the will-to-do: “A will ‘to do something specific,’ however, is called an 
‘intention [Absicht]’” (1973: 137). Yet, intention in this sense, according to Scheler, is not the 
same as a decision or resolution (Vorsatz), cf. 1973: 124, 138. It is the latter notion, not the 
former, that I use as co-extensive with “intention” in this paper. 
12 To this list, one could also add that, whereas willing comes in a polar form (“she wants to 
tango, he doesn’t,” to use Mulligan’s example), intentions do not, cf. Stein 1970: 311, 
Mulligan 2013: 108. 
The first element is that intentions have to be described as mental acts – understood in 
the sense of mental actions: “a doing of the self [ein Tun des Ichs] and thereby a 
spontaneous act” (Reinach 2012: 18). They are actions because the subject is active in 
a specific sense – she is the “phenomenal originator [phänomenaler Urheber]” of the 
act (Reinach 2012: 18). To see this, consider the difference between having a belief 
that p and asserting p. Assertion, though grounded in the belief that p, is a linguistic 
action that is spontaneously performed by the subject; it exists at a given point in 
time, and does not have a temporal extension. By contrast, beliefs do not seem to be 
under the control of a subject and show a dispositional nature – they can last for years 
and do not need to be linguistically articulated (cf. Reinach 1989a). Similar 
considerations hold for the distinction between willing and intention. The willing 
assumes a dispositional form (“I always wanted to visit Copenhagen, but I never 
found the time”), but it can also ground a decision (“I now decide: I will fly to 
Copenhagen next month”), in which case we face a spontaneous and punctual action 
of a subject (Hildebrand 1969: 36, Pfänder 1963: 134, Reinach 2012: 18f13). 
 
But what sort of action is that? Phenomenologists tend to portray it as a case of self-
determination (cf. Pfänder 1967: 23, Heller 1932: 254f): among other things, making 
a decision also means determining oneself to do something – in other words, the very 
self is at stake in intentions to the effect that “immediate self-consciousness” always 
belongs to these acts (cf. Pfänder 1967: 23). 14  Characterizing intentions as self-
determining acts has two important consequences – the first is that the content of the 
decision has to range over actions of the self. After all, self-determination is 
determination of one’s conduct, and I cannot decide on things that are not under my 
control. The second is that the perspective that a subject has towards her actions is 
unique and comes with a unique phenomenology. Let us approach these consequences 
step by step. 
 
In the case of willing, the content of the experience – to put this in Scheler’s parlance 
– is just something to be realized. No reference needs to be made to the agent in the 
content of willing. By contrast, intentions can only be intentions of their subjects to 
do something, meaning that the subject has to be adequately involved in the process of 
bringing about the state of affairs that satisfies the intention. This implies that the 
                                                        
13 While holding that intentions are actions and, hence, aligning them with forgiving, praising, 
blaming, asserting, questioning, commanding, etc. (which are not stances), Reinach also 
maintains, somehow ambiguously, that making a resolution (Vorsatzfassen) is a stance, cf. 
1913: 294. 
14 This is an idea that is captured by the reflexivity of the corresponding German verbs 
pointed out above, but which is not mapped onto the locution “I intend to φ.” In this sentence, 
the infinitive clause hides the fact that it is I who am supposed to be the subject of φing. One 
way to make this transparent is by reformulating the dependent clause as a that-clause: “I 
intend that I φ.” Despite the awkwardness of this construction, cf. Williamson (forthcoming) 
for arguments in favor of the equivalence between these two formulations. 
content of willing differs from the content of an intention, for the latter content, not 
the former, must include a reference to the agent.  
 
But once this conceptual result is achieved, one is allowed to take a further step: we 
have seen that, according to Scheler, the content of willing is framed as something 
that is to be brought about. Such a normative perspective is inherited by the intention, 
as it were. It is because I want a given state of affairs to exist or obtain, that I decide 
to do something to bring about that state of affairs – just like the content of willing, so 
is the content of the intention also framed as something that shall be brought about. 
But given that the intention’s content is about an action of the agent, the normative 
perspective adopted by the subject in intending to do something now puts the very 
subject of this intention under a commitment to realize the action. This is nicely 
formulated by Hildebrand: 
 
An ought-relation [Soll-Beziehung] with the realization is already given in willing. 
But only the intention [das Vorsetzen] makes this relation committal [festlegen], 
insofar as it assigns a determined form to this relation. If the stance [i.e., the 
willing, A.S.] applies only to the state of affairs, then the resolution [das 
Sichvornehmen] is already directed towards the realization of the state of affairs 
(1969: 34, my trans and emphasis, cf. also Reiner 1927: 71). 
 
Accordingly, the sentence “I intend to φ” can be interpreted in two different senses. 
According to the first interpretation, this sentence is nothing else than an instance of a 
theoretical proposition of the form “there is an x such that this x intends to φ,” where x 
refers to the utterer. But according to the second interpretation, which in Pfänder’s15 
view is the correct one (cf. 1967: 21f), that sentence does not express a theoretical 
proposition, but rather an intent – a logical meaning of an altogether different kind. 
The proposition does not posit a state of affairs: it proposes it (the function at stake is 
not one of Setzung, but Vorsetzung). And, indeed, it is the latter proposition (not the 
former) that is semantically equivalent with the proposition “φ should be done” (cf. 
Pfänder 1982: 310 – and given all what was said above, one could perhaps add: “φ 
should be done – by me”). 
 
However, what is it that the agent commits herself to, when she makes a decision? 
Certainly, this is a given action of the subject, but early phenomenologists further 
specify this: they claim that the correlate of an intention is a project (Projekt, cf. 
Pfänder 1967: 22, Hildebrand 1969: 43, Reinach 1989b: 291) – and, in doing so, they 
signal that this correlate comes with an instrumental structure, even if such a structure 
may be articulated only in nuce. Put another way, the agent commits herself to 
bringing about a given state of affairs by means of a given strategy – a strategy that 
                                                        
15 To be more precise, Pfänder’s example is “I will φ”; however, this sentence is taken to 
express a Vorsatz, hence, a resolution or an intention. The interpretation of Vorsatz developed 
in this paper would license the reformulation of Pfänder’s sentence into “I intend to φ.” 
involves means and ends and that, therefore, is subject to the norms of instrumental 
rationality. Indeed, the process of settling on means and reflecting upon the best 
strategy towards a goal is one that has its own phenomenology, as Reinach highlights. 
He calls the epistemic agency that a subject engages in when she has to determine 
“how” to reach the goal an “intellectual-practical reflection” (1912/13: 304). This 
form of reflection is not purely practical because it is not concerned with the ultimate 
goal of an action (this being the object of a merely practical reflection, like the one 
outlined at the end of 3.1). But this is also not purely intellectual because it aims at 
solving a problem, which is immediately related to an action and to the identification 
of the best strategy to achieve a goal.  
 
A second consequence of introducing intentions into the architecture of intentional 
agency is assigning the agent a privileged perspective towards her action. The 
decision being made, the agent starts engaging in the actual action the moment a 
further experience is formed – this is the experience of realization or performance 
(Reinach 1912/13: 305f, Scheler 1973: 121f), which can be further characterized 
either as a doing or as an omitting (Hildebrand 1969: 64).16 Such an experience is 
always relative to and dependent on an intention – for realization is the realization of 
the content of an intention. But this means that certain bodily movements are 
conceived of by an agent as a genuine action only when these movements are 
experienced as the realization of an intention. This fact bestows the agent with unique 
epistemic authority: actions are always actions from an agent’s perspective, for only 
the agent can access her action from within, as it were.  
 
To employ Anscombe’s expression, the agent is granted non-observational knowledge 
about her actions, since it is her intention, and her intention alone, that determines 
whether certain movements or activities are experiences of realization (of that very 
intention) or not. This gives the agent the last word about her actions, as it were. 
Certainly, third parties might be in a better position to describe the bodily movements 
and the consequences of an action. However, bodily movements and consequences 
taken per se are not actions for they do not display the correct mind-dependence or, 
perhaps more precisely, the correct intention-dependence. That is why the very notion 
of an intentional action (Handlung) is restricted to those activities of a subject that are 




                                                        
16 In addition, Hildebrand postulates a further act, an ‘triggering act’ (Inangriffnahme), which 
is supposed to initiate the realization proper (cf. Hildebrand 1969: 36f). Reiner criticizes this 
idea by arguing that the triggering act is nothing else than the phenomenally salient initial part 
of the realization (cf. Reiner 1927: 76ff). I am thankful to Christopher Erhard who drew my 
attention to Reiner’s criticism of Hildebrand.  
Phenomenological investigations into practical intentionality are diverse, rich and 
articulated, but they all rest upon two basic pillars. First, actions are motivated by 
volitions – volitions are complex attitudes: they are stances, which rely on a yet 
different stratum of experiences. Second, volitions support deliberation. The 
deliberative moment of action is exemplified by intentions, which play an essential 
role in agency. Deliberation is essential because it puts the agent and her actions 
under the yoke of practical rationality and grounds a unique form of practical 
knowledge.  
 
Two general conclusions can be drawn. The first is that, from the very beginning, 
practical intentionality represented a core interest for phenomenology. Most crucially, 
phenomenology secured a series of insights into intentional agency that developed out 
of a sophisticated theory of intentionality – now in the sense of aboutness. But all this 
becomes especially visible once the focus on such historical considerations is 
enlarged and early phenomenologists and their works are paid the careful 
consideration they deserve.17  
 
The second and perhaps more important conclusion one could draw from this 
reconstruction, is that, when it comes to the topic of intentionality in general and to 
that of practical intentionality more specifically, one is well advised to develop 
theories that are conducive to and in accordance with phenomenological descriptions 
– and not, or at least not primarily, folk psychology. A look at early phenomenology 
not only highlights all the striking convergences between the phenomenological 
account of practical intentionality and the current BDI model, but it can also pave the 
way to systematic investigations in which the wealth and fruitfulness of 
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